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Paranoia denotes the unfounded fear that others intend to cause
you harm (e.g. ‘People are out to get me’, ‘Someone deliberately
tried to irritate me’, ‘There is a conspiracy against me’).1 Interview
and questionnaire research indicates that paranoid thinking
occurs regularly in 15–20% of the general population.2–4 Levels
of trust in society are associated with social cohesion and
mortality rates.5
There is a continuum of severity of paranoia in the general
population.6 At the extreme end are persecutory delusions seen
in psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. Consistent with this
continuum view, non-clinical and clinical paranoid experiences
are associated with the same risk factors1,7 and the presence of
non-clinical symptoms increases the likelihood of subsequent
diagnosis of psychotic disorder.8 Studying non-clinical paranoid
experiences is therefore not only of interest in its own right, but
informs the understanding of clinically severe persecutory
delusions.
Questionnaire assessments of paranoia cannot rule out
paranoid thoughts that are grounded in reality.9 Even interview
methods often cannot establish the truth of the claims underlying
a suspicious thought. A laboratory method of eliciting truly
paranoid thoughts overcomes the problem.
Clinical observation suggests that the most immediate trigger
for a paranoid thought is the misinterpretation of an everyday
experience such as a person’s facial expression. However, this poses
problems for the study of paranoid thinking, since it is impossible
to give everybody the same everyday experience. This is par-
ticularly important, as people with paranoid thoughts often act
differently with others (e.g. timidly) and thereby elicit different
reactions. Our solution was to use the presence-inducing powers
of computer-generated interactive (virtual reality) environments
(this is the tendency to respond to virtual situations and events
as if they were real).10 Our chosen neutral social environment
was an underground train ride (see online Fig. DS1).
The key advantage of this method is that paranoid responses
must be unfounded as the computer characters are programmed
to behave in ways deemed by consensus to be neutral. No matter
what a person does, the characters will remain neutral in their
apparent responses. In pilot studies we have shown that paranoid
thinking about virtual reality characters can occur in students11,12
and in people at high risk of developing psychosis.13 In the current
paper we report the first full-scale test in the general population.
Virtual reality can be used to identify the causes of paranoid
thinking. In the current study we based our hypotheses about
the factors that would predict the occurrence of paranoia on the
Threat-Anticipation Model1,14,15 (Fig.1). This explicitly acknowl-
edges that there are multiple causes of paranoid thinking, but
identifies the following as particularly important: affective
processes, especially anxiety, worry, and interpersonal sensitivity;
anomalous experiences such as hallucinations and perceptual
anomalies; reasoning biases, particularly jumping to conclusions
and belief inflexibility; and social factors such as adverse events
and environments. In essence, it is hypothesised that at a time
of stress the individual feels different and interprets these factors
in a threatening way because of an anxious mood state and
previous adverse experiences. Reasoning biases cause these fears
to reach a delusional level of conviction.
In summary, we set out to demonstrate that individuals in the
general population experience unfounded paranoid thoughts, and
to determine factors predictive of paranoia. We hypothesised that
a significant minority of the general public would have paranoid
thoughts about the avatars, that these would be individuals prone
to paranoid thoughts in day-to-day life and that factors from the
cognitive model would predict paranoia in virtual reality.
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Background
Judging whether we can trust other people is central to
social interaction, despite being error-prone. A fear of others
can be instilled by the contemporary political and social
climate. Unfounded mistrust is called paranoia, and in severe
forms is a central symptom of schizophrenia.
Aims
To demonstrate that individuals without severe mental illness
in the general population experience unfounded paranoid
thoughts, and to determine factors predictive of paranoia
using the first laboratory method of capturing the
experience.
Method
Two hundred members of the general public were
comprehensively assessed, and then entered a virtual reality
train ride populated by neutral characters. Ordinal logistic
regressions (controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, education,
intellectual functioning, socio-economic status, train use,
playing of computer games) were used to determine
predictors of paranoia.
Results
The majority agreed that the characters were neutral, or
even thought they were friendly. However, a substantial
minority reported paranoid concerns. Paranoia was strongly
predicted by anxiety, worry, perceptual anomalies and
cognitive inflexibility.
Conclusions
This is the most unambiguous demonstration of paranoid
ideation in the general public so far. Paranoia can be
understood in terms of cognitive factors. The use of virtual
reality should lead to rapid advances in the understanding of
paranoia.
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Methods
After completion of a comprehensive psychological assessment,
participants spent 4min in a London underground train virtual
environment, followed by measurement of their subjective
experience.
Participants
A representative sample of the local adult population was
recruited. A leaflet advertising a study of ‘people’s reactions in
virtual reality’ at King’s College London was sent to all households
in local postcodes. Participants were not informed that the study
was of paranoia until completion of testing. Individuals reporting
a history of severe mental illness such as schizophrenia (n=7) were
excluded from the study. Individuals with a history of epilepsy
(n=2) were also excluded because of potential side-effects of
virtual reality. A total of 100 male and 100 female participants
were recruited. The study had received approval from the local
research ethics committee. Testing took place from September
2006 to March 2007 (14 months after terrorist attacks on the
London underground).
Virtual reality
The head-mounted display (see online Fig. DS2) used was a
Virtual Research VR1280, which has a resolution of 128061024
in each eye, a 608 diagonal field of view and a refresh rate of
60Hz. The tracking system used for the scenario was the
Intersense IS900. The tracker uses a hybrid of inertial and ultra-
sonic sensors to determine the orientation and position of the user
during the simulation. The sensors were laid out in a ceiling
constellation grid above the user. The tracker data were accessed
by a Virtual Reality Peripheral Network (VRPN) IS900 server.
The virtual reality environment comprised a 4min journey
between two stops on a London underground (‘tube’) train, popu-
lated by computer characters (see online Figs DS1 and DS3). The
Distributed Immersive Virtual Environment (DIVE) software
platform was used to create the overall scenario.16 Both the train
shell and the computer characters (‘avatars’) were created using
3D Studio Max run on Windows. The avatar motions were made
using an optical motion capture system. Each avatar had its own
background motion that repeated throughout the scenario. Each
avatar had one motion that approximated their breath and
another motion that randomised the direction of their gaze. In
addition, several of the avatars responded to participants’ gaze
by looking in their direction (e.g. one avatar would occasionally
smile at the user when looked at). The audio for the scene,
comprising background tube noise and low-level snippets of
conversation, was rendered in stereo, without spatialisation, using
a Creative sound card.
Measures
Basic demographic data and information on use of the London
underground were collected. Before entering the virtual environ-
ment, participants completed assessments of intellectual function-
ing and trait paranoia, followed by a battery of measures related to
factors in the cognitive model of paranoia.
Cognitive ability
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. This scale17 is a
standardised short and reliable measure of IQ. The Vocabulary
and Matrix Reasoning sub-tests were used in the current study.
Paranoid thinking
Green et al Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS) Part B. The
GPTS18 is a trait measure of paranoia. Each of the 16 items in
the persecutory sub-scale (e.g. ‘I was convinced there was a
conspiracy against me’) is rated on a 5-point scale. The presence
of persecutory ideation is assessed over the past month and higher
scores indicate greater levels of persecutory thinking. The
questionnaire has been psychometrically evaluated in clinical
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Trigger
Major life events, on-going stress, sleep
disturbance, trauma, drug misuse
Internal and external events
Internal: arousal, anomalous
experiences, core cognitive dysfunction
External: discrepant, negative, socially
significant or ambiguous events
Emotion
Anxiety, worry, beliefs about
self, others and the world
formed in up-bringing and
subsequent experiences
Reasoning
Jumping to conclusions,
confirmation bias, failure to
consider alternatives
Search for meaning
Search for understanding/meaning
Not wanting to talk to others/ having
nobody to provide feedback on ideas
The persecutory (threat) belief
3
3
3
Fig. 1 Outline of factors involved in the development of persecutory delusions.
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and non-clinical populations. The internal consistency of the scale
and test–retest reliability are good.
Emotional processes
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. This is a 42-item instrument19
with three sub-scales measuring current symptoms of depression,
anxiety and stress. Each of the sub-scales consists of 14 items with
a 0–3 rating scale (0=did not apply to me at all, 3=applied to me
very much). Higher scores indicate higher levels of emotional
distress. The anxiety and depression sub-scales were used in the
current study.
Penn State Worry Questionnaire. This20 is the most established
measure of trait worry style and has been used in non-clinical
and clinical populations. Each of the 16 items are rated on a 5-
point scale. Higher scores indicate a greater tendency to worry.
Worry Domains Questionnaire. This scale21 assesses the
occurrence of a range of common (non-paranoid) worries (i.e.
in contrast to the Penn State Worry Questionnaire, the scale as-
sesses content). It contains 25 items using a 5-point rating scale
(‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’). Higher scores indicate greater levels
of worry.
Catastrophising Interview. The Catastrophising Interview22 is
an experimental assessment of worry. Individuals are asked what
worries them about their main worry and this question is repeated
for all their subsequent answers. The procedure is terminated
when no further responses are given (i.e. the person can think
of no more worries in the chain). Each answer is counted as a
catastrophising step. Increasing numbers of catastrophising steps
indicate a greater worry style.
Brief Core Schema Scales. This measure,23 developed with non-
clinical and psychosis groups, has 24 items each rated on a 5-point
scale (0–4). Four sub-scale scores are derived: negative beliefs
about self, positive beliefs about self, negative beliefs about others
and positive beliefs about others. Higher scores reflect greater
endorsement of items.
Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure. This is a 36-item scale24
designed to assess interpersonal sensitivity, defined as undue
and excessive awareness of, and sensitivity to, the behaviour and
feelings of others. Self-statements are rated on a 4-point scale
(1=very unlike self, 2=moderately unlike self, 3=moderately like
self, 4=very like self). High scores indicate greater interpersonal
sensitivity. The psychometric properties of the scale have been
tested in non-clinical individuals, general practice attendees and
psychiatric patients.
Reasoning
Cognitive Flexibility Scale. This is a 12-item self-report scale25
assessing awareness that in any given situation there are options
and alternatives, and the willingness and confidence to be flexible.
Items are scores on a 6-point scale (‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly
disagree’). Higher scores indicate greater levels of flexibility. Relia-
bility and validity have been established in a non-clinical sample.
60:40 Beads Task. This probabilistic reasoning task26 assesses
data-gathering style. The key variable is the number of items
requested before a decision is made.
Anomalous experience
Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale. This 32-item question-
naire,27 developed in both non-clinical and psychosis groups,
assesses perceptual anomalies such as changes in levels of sensory
intensity, distortion of the external world, sensory flooding and
hallucinations. A higher score represents the reporting of a greater
number of perceptual anomalies.
Maudsley Addiction Profile. This profile28 was developed with a
large sample from a substance misuse clinic. Respondents are
asked directly about the use over the past month of illicit
drugs, including cannabis, cocaine powder, crack cocaine, heroin,
amphetamines and methadone.
Social
Life Stressor Checklist. The checklist29 asks respondents about
the occurrence of a range of severe life events (e.g. serious acci-
dent, physical attack, sexual abuse). If the respondent reports
the occurrence of an event, subsequent questions ask when the
event happened, whether the person thought at the time that ser-
ious harm or death could result, and whether feelings of intense
helplessness, fear or horror occurred. We scored only events that
reached the severity criterion related to post-traumatic stress
disorder diagnosis. The total number of traumatic events, the
total number of victimisation events, the number of childhood
traumatic events, and the number of traumatic events in the past
year were recorded.
Social Support Questionnaire. Each of the seven items of this
instrument30 has two parts. The first part assesses the number
of people the respondent believes they can turn to in times of need
(e.g. ‘Whom can you really count on to be dependable when you
need help?). The second part measures the degree of satisfaction
with that support. Two scores are derived: number or perceived
availability score and satisfaction score. Higher scores indicate
greater perceptions of social support.
Social and Emotional Loneliness Scale for Adults. This 37-item
self-report questionnaire,31 developed in a non-clinical sample,
has three sub-scales: romantic, family, and social loneliness. Each
item is rated on a 7-point scale (‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly
agree’). Higher scores indicate greater levels of loneliness.
Measures of the virtual reality experience
After being in the virtual environment, participants completed a
measure of persecutory thinking, visual analogue rating scales,
and an assessment of their degree of immersion in the virtual
environment.
State Social Paranoia Scale. This scale32 has ten persecutory
items (e.g. ‘Someone stared at me in order to upset me’; ‘Someone
was trying to isolate me’; ‘Someone was trying to make me dis-
tressed’), each rated on a 5-point scale. The items conform to a
recent definition of persecutory ideation.33 The scale has excellent
internal reliability, adequate test–retest reliability, convergent
validity with both independent interviewer ratings and self-report
measures, and divergent validity with regard to measures of posi-
tive and neutral thinking. In the current study the internal relia-
bility of the questionnaire was high (Cronbach’s alpha=0.90).
Higher scores on the scale indicate greater levels of persecutory
thinking.
Visual analogue rating scales. Participants marked on separate
10 cm lines the degree to which the people on the train were
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hostile, friendly and neutral. Higher ratings indicated greater
endorsement of the characteristic.
Sense of Presence Scale. The scale34 contains four questions,
each rated on a 7-point scale, that assess immersion in the
environment (e.g. ‘Which was strongest, your sense of being on
the virtual tube or being in the real world of the laboratory?).
Higher scores indicate a greater sense of presence in the virtual
world.
Effects of the simulator
Simulator Sickness Questionnaire. Virtual reality, particularly
on early simulators, was known to cause side-effects similar to
motion sickness. Possible causes may have been flicker, visual dis-
tortion and that earlier systems responded slowly to participants’
movements. The 16-item Simulator Sickness Questionnaire,35
derived from a large factor analysis, assesses three symptom
clusters: oculomotor (e.g. blurred vision), disorientation (e.g.
dizziness) and nausea (e.g. vomiting). Each item is assessed on a
4-point scale (‘none’ to ‘very strong’). The total scores are
weighted. Higher scores indicate a higher level of symptoms.
Our participants completed the questionnaire immediately before
and after the simulation, and after they had completed the other
post-simulation instruments.
Analysis
Analyses were carried out using SPSS Version 12.02 and Stata
Version 9 for Windows. The dependent variable was persecutory
ideation assessed by the State Social Paranoia Scale,32 grouped
into six ordinal categories (corresponding to scores of 10, 11–
15, 16–20, 21–25, 26–30, 530). There were two steps to the
analysis. The first determined which, if any, of the variables had
a direct effect on the score obtained: each variable was modelled
separately using an ordinal logistic regression (proportional odds
models as implemented by the Stata ologit command) controlling
for age, gender, ethnicity, intellectual functioning, socio-economic
status, level of education, gaming experience, and frequency of use
of the London underground. The second step included all the
independent variables. An ordinal logistic regression was carried
out using the exploratory modelling technique backward elimina-
tion.36 Variables were removed one by one, chosen by the variable
with the largest P-value, until all variables had P-values less than
0.10. A number of other model types (Poisson, negative binomial,
gamma, logistic), along with a standard linear regression followed
by bootstrapping, were performed on the data, but it was clear,
using the Akaike Information Criteria and the Bayesian Inform-
ation Criteria,37 that ordinal logistic regression produced the best
fit for the data. The data-set contained very few missing values
because the maximum number of participants who failed to
complete each measure never exceeded three. The stepwise pro-
cedure was repeated manually in order to include as many parti-
cipants as possible, and all but one participant were used in the
final model. Principal component analysis was used as a sensitivity
analysis to assess whether or not any co-linearity existed within
the predictors. The results showed very little change when com-
pared with the standard analysis. The proportionality assumption
(that the increase in risk across the state paranoia categories is
comparable) was checked for all the analyses by including the
cut-points in the ordinal model as an interaction variable and then
assessing the models log likelihood values. There was no evidence
to reject the proportionality assumption for the study analyses. All
hypothesis testing was two-tailed, and 95% confidence intervals
are reported.
Results
Demographic data
The average age of the participants was 37.5 years (s.d.=13.3, range
18–77). The mean IQ score was 104.6 (s.d.=12.0, minimum=69,
maximum=133). Further basic information on the participants
is presented in the online Table DS1. It can be seen that there
is a spread of participants across socio-economic categories,
and the proportion in each category is broadly representative of
the UK population.
Virtual reality side-effects
Weighted scores on the Simulator Sickness Questionnaire before
entering the virtual environment, after leaving virtual reality and
at the end of testing are presented in Table 1. Endorsement rates
of items were low. Overall it can be seen that virtual reality did
not have negative side-effects. There was an expected temporary
increase in disorientation following taking off the headset, but
levels of all symptoms were lower at the end of testing than before
entering the virtual environment.
Occurrence of persecutory thoughts
What did the participants think about the computer characters? A
selection of quotations from different participants are presented in
Table 2. It can be seen that there are striking divergences in the
views of the participants. As expected, the general view of the
avatars was that they were neutral (mean VAS score=6.6,
s.d.=2.6) or friendly (mean VAS score=5.0, s.d.=2.2). There was
less frequent endorsement of the view that the avatars were hostile
(mean VAS score=1.5, s.d.=1.8). Persecutory items on the State
Social Paranoia Scale were commonly endorsed (mode=10,
median=10, mean=12.6, s.d.=4.8, range 10–38), although the data
were clearly skewed, with 105 participants reporting no paranoid
thoughts. In the six ordinal categories (scores of 10, 11–15, 16–20,
21–25, 26–30,530) there were 105, 64, 16, 9, 3 and 3 participants
respectively. In an ordinal logistic regression there was a sig-
nificant association between trait levels of paranoia and the
occurrence of persecutory thinking in virtual reality (OR=1.04,
P=0.001, 95% CI 1.02–1.07). Individuals who reported paranoid
thoughts in day-to-day life were about twice as likely to experience
persecutory thoughts in virtual reality compared with individuals
who reported no paranoid thoughts in day-to-day life (OR=
2.32, P=0.003, 95% CI 1.33–4.03). These findings validate the
experimental procedure.
Prediction of persecutory thinking
The results of the ordinal logistic regressions are presented in
Table 3. Experience of playing computer games is a strong predic-
tor of paranoid thinking, perhaps indicating that game-playing
individuals are more likely to automatically process the computer
characters as real. Paranoid thinking is also strongly predicted by
many factors in our cognitive model: higher levels of anxiety,
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Table 1 Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) scores
SSQ item
Before VR
Mean (s.d.)
After VR
Mean (s.d.)
At end of testing
Mean (s.d.)
Total 18.0 (21.0) 19.1 (23.8) 12.6 (19.9)
Oculomotor 18.9 (21.4) 17.7 (20.4) 11.6 (17.0)
Disorientation 14.3 (22.8) 18.7 (30.5) 11.7 (24.8)
Nausea 12.3 (16.2) 13.8 (20.2) 9.5 (17.3)
VR, virtual reality environment.
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depression, worry style, everyday worries, catastrophising worry,
interpersonal sensitivity, negative ideas about self, negative ideas
about others, cognitive inflexibility, perceptual anomalies, and
loneliness associated with the family situation. When interpreting
the odds ratios it should be remembered that the scales are
continuous. Paranoia was not predicted by data-gathering style
as assessed by the probabilistic reasoning task, number of social
supports or degree of immersion in virtual reality.
When all the chosen independent variables were analysed
together, paranoid thinking was predicted by higher levels of
catastrophising worry, worry style, perceptual anomalies, and
cognitive inflexibility (online Table DS2). It is also of interest that
women and those who regularly used the London underground
reported less paranoia.
Discussion
We have demonstrated that virtual reality is a safe and acceptable
method of studying paranoia in the laboratory. Computer
characters can elicit paranoid reactions. Consistent with the latest
epidemiological research, over 40% of our general population
sample had paranoid thoughts. Our study is the clearest
demonstration yet that paranoid thinking is not confined to
people with severe mental illness. This study was carried out about
1 year after the 2005 London underground bombings. The impact
of terrorism on paranoid thinking in the general population is not
known but should be researched. In this study, those who used the
London underground less often were more paranoid. Our study
also provides a theoretical advance in the understanding of persec-
utory ideation. The associations with anxiety, depression, worry,
interpersonal sensitivity and negative ideas about self firmly place
paranoia as an emotional concern. The associations of the
continuous scales with paranoia are significant. For example, a
10-point increase in anxiety is associated with over twice the risk
of paranoia and a 20-point increase is associated with over five
times the risk of paranoia. However, non-affective factors are also
implicated, notably the presence of subtle perceptual anomalies
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Table 2 Participants’ thoughts after leaving the virtual
reality environment
Participants’ responses
Positive
‘It was nice much nicer than a real experience – people aren’t so
forthcoming with their feelings in a real situation. Thought they were
pretty friendly’
‘People were generally very friendly’
‘One guy was checking me out – flattering’
‘There were people smiling at you, which was nice’
Neutral
‘Felt like a normal tube. People just trying to get where they want
to go’
‘Didn’t think anyone thought anything about me. All getting on with
own business. Nobody seemed to notice me’
‘I thought they were like people on the tube – some smile, others
ignore you’
‘I thought everyone kept themselves to themselves’
Negative
‘Thought a couple of the men were stuck up and nasty. Lady sitting
down laughed at me when I walked past’
‘There was an aggressive person – his intention was to intimidate me
and make me feel uneasy’
‘One guy looked pissed off and maybe one guy flicked the finger
at me’
‘There was a man who tried to stare me out. But I didn’t give him
any ammunition. Believe his intention was to start an argument’
Table 3 Ordinal logistic regressions for individual
variables controlling for basic demographic data
Variable OR 95% CI
Age 0.99 0.97, 1.01
Gender
Female 0.69 0.41–1.18
Ethnicity
White
Black and minority ethnic
Other
–
1.81
1.02
–
0.91–3.56
0.46–2.29
IQ 1.00 0.98–1.03
Education
None/GCSE
AS/A-level
Diploma
Degree
Postgraduate
–
2.67*
3.08*
1.42
0.72
–
1.12–6.40
1.27–7.44
0.67–3.04
0.30–1.72
Plays computer games
Yes 3.11*** 1.78–5.43
London underground use
Never
5Monthly
Monthly
Weekly
Daily
–
0.72
0.49
0.81
0.64
–
0.30–1.71
0.21–1.15
0.40–1.62
0.23–1.82
Socio-economic status
Higher professional
Lower managerial and professional
Intermediate occupations
Small employers and own account
Lower supervisory and technical
Semi-routine
Routine
Never worked and unemployed
Not classifiable (students)
–
2.88
4.34*
2.48
1.45
2.61
3.06
3.06
1.92
–
0.84–9.88
1.02–18.40
0.53–11.62
0.25–8.55
0.58–11.76
0.67–13.87
0.84–11.14
0.50–7.45
Anxietya 1.09** 1.02–1.15
Worrya
Penn State Worry Questionnaire
Worry Domains Questionnaire
Catastrophising Interview
1.04***
1.04***
1.08***
1.02–1.07
1.02–1.05
1.04–1.13
Interpersonal sensitivitya 1.04*** 1.02–1.07
Beliefs abouta
Self, negative
Self, positive
Others, negative
Others, positive
1.14*
0.95
1.12**
0.98
1.03–1.26
0.89–1.01
1.05–1.20
0.91–1.04
Depressiona 1.05** 1.02–1.09
Cognitive flexibilitya 0.94** 0.90–0.98
Jumping to conclusionsa 1.01 0.94–1.08
Anomalous perceptionsa 1.08** 1.02–1.14
Illicit drug usea
Yes 1.61 0.82–3.17
Lonelinessa
Romantic
Family
Social
1.01
1.03*
1.01
0.99–1.02
1.01–1.05
1.00–1.03
Support satisfactiona 0.79 0.58–1.09
No. social supportsa 0.90 0.77–1.05
No. lifetime traumasa 1.11 0.98–1.26
No. lifetime victimisationsa 1.04 0.84–1.27
No. childhood abuse eventsa 1.05 0.70–1.58
No. recent traumasa 1.37 0.78–2.43
Sense of presencea 1.02 0.96–1.09
A, Advanced; AS, Advanced Subsidiary; GCSE, General Certificate of Secondary
Education.
a. Individual variable controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, IQ, socio-economic status,
education, playing computer games, London underground use.
*P50.05, **P50.01, ***P50.001.
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and inflexibility in thinking about dealing with situations. It is
plausible that noticing anomalous experiences is accompanied
by feelings of oddness that in the context of affective disturbance
lead to threatening interpretations. It is of note that these factors
have also been implicated in the development of clinical para-
noia.1
There are two notes of caution. First, the identification of
paranoid thinking inevitably depends on self-report. No other
markers of the experience are available. The study therefore relied
on people being able to report their thoughts. Second, the depen-
dent variable had considerable skew, leading to ordinal scaling and
a reduction in statistical power. Nevertheless the study indicates
great promise for virtual reality in studying paranoia. Causal roles
of psychological processes can be established by their manipula-
tion before individuals enter virtual reality. It will be important
to compare the reactions in virtual reality of a non-clinical group
with patients with persecutory delusions. Another valuable
research path will be to determine the environmental components
that trigger paranoid thinking. It is also likely that exposure to
virtual reality environments could be incorporated into the
emerging cognitive–behavioural interventions for paranoia.38
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